«CNS OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 22 A Chen Kane, PhD JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES Planning Ahead: A Blueprint to Negotiate and Implement ...»
A BLUEPRINT TO NEGOTIATE AND IMPLEMENT A
WEAPON-OF-MASS-DESTRUCTION-FREE ZONE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
CNS OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 22
Chen Kane, PhD
JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIESPlanning Ahead: A Blueprint to Negotiate and Implement a Weapon-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East CNS Occasional Paper No. 22 Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for supporting this project. She is grateful to all those at Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and elsewhere who reviewed this document, especially Jean Pascal Zanders and Daniel Feakes. The views expressed herein are those of the author, as are any inaccuracies in fact or interpretation.
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey Washington, DC, Office 1400 K Street NW, Suite 1225 Tel: +1 (202) 842-3100 Fax: +1 (202) 842-0556 http://nonproliferation.org ISBN # 978-0-9892361-8-8 © The President and Trustees of Middlebury College, March 2015 Cover image: Google Earth Editing and production: Rhianna Tyson Kreger
PLANNING AHEADA Blueprint to Negotiate and Implement a Weapon-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East CNS OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 22 Chen Kane, PhD Table of ConTenTs Chen Kane James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Glossary
1. The Pre-Negotiation Stage
1.1. The Negotiations Mandate
1.2. Rules of Procedure
1.3. Issuing the Invitations
1.4. Deciding on Invitees and Delineating the Zone
1.5. The Role of Out-of-Region States
2. The Legal Framework
2.1. The Legal Framework of the Negotiations
2.2. Other Covered Territories
2.3. Treaty Components
3. The Technical Framework(s)
3.1. Verification of WMD Dismantlement and Disarmament
3.2. Verification of Compliance
4. The Institutional Framework
4.1. Compliance Judgment Authority
4.2. A Regional Organization?
4.5. Public Diplomacy and Civil Society
About the Author
-iPlanning Ahead: A Blueprint to Negotiate and Implement a WMDFZ in the Middle East March 2015 Glossary ABACC Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security AFCONE African Commission on Nuclear Energy BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention BWFZ biological-weapon-free zone CANWFZ Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone CBMs confidence-building measures CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement CSBM confidence- and security-building measures CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization CWC Chemical Weapons Convention CWFZ chemical-weapon-free zone DoP declaration of principles DSFZ delivery-system-free zone Euratom European Atomic Energy Community GPC general purpose criterion HCOC Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ISU Implementation Support Unit LAS League of Arab States MECIDS Middle East Consortium on Infectious Disease Surveillance MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFU no-first-use NNWS non-nuclear weapon state NPR Nuclear Posture Review NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NWFZ nuclear-weapon-free zone NWS nuclear weapon states OAU Organization of African Unity OPANAL Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons PLNS pre- and post-launch notification system PMD possible military dimensions PSA positive security assurances SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone SESAME Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications for the Middle East SNC Syrian National Coalition SQP significant quantities protocol UAE United Arab Emirates WMDFZ weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone
- ii Chen Kane James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies exeCuTive summary Freeing the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and establishing a weaponof-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) is a concept that originated many decades ago. Although this idea has existed for more than forty years, surprisingly little thought has been given to how it can be realistically implemented. Currently, there remain significant gaps regarding core concepts of the WMDFZ (the “Zone”) negotiations and implementation within the Middle East and internationally.
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies offers this report in an effort to address these gaps with regard to the planned WMDFZ Middle East Conference, negotiation process, and the subsequent establishment of such a Zone by identifying the legal, technical, and organizational elements required to support the Zone negotiations and implementation.
Creating a WMDFZ is a very tall order; not only has one never been created before, but also all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) formalized an already existing situation—the absence of nuclear weapons in their region. The WMDFZ, by contrast, is aimed at reversing the status quo by dismantling existing WMD capabilities and programs in a region that is suspected of hosting all three categories of WMD. Moreover, the region suffers from deep-rooted conflicts and mistrust, and many areas are undergoing considerable social and political change. The increasing influence of non-state actors on states’ affairs in the region is another complicating factor. Additionally, while there are regional and international regimes and organizations charged with verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programs and chemical industries (all of which could inform the WMDFZ negotiators), there are no comparable mechanisms to cover nuclear and biological weapons dismantlement, verify sensitive activities for biological programs, nor sufficiently regulate WMD delivery systems—all of which are mandated under the Middle East WMDFZ.
The report offers a number of constructive suggestions that could engender significant progress on the issue, even while the current political impasse precludes states’ ability to make political commitments or convene the WMDFZ Conference prior to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. For instance, states can create a Group of Experts to discuss legal, technical, and organizational issues essential to negotiating and implementing the Zone. Many of the issues identified in this report should be discussed first within regional states in a comprehensive interagency process, not just to formulate national positions on the issues, but also to clarify their declared, undeclared, known, or unknown WMD capabilities.
The regional experts group could also consider key legal aspects such as the negotiation mandate, scope, rules of procedures, and delineation of the Zone. This would include identifying options for issues such as: what weapon systems would be prohibited under the Zone (i.e., only nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery systems, or also radiological); what should be states obligations under the Zone; are there areas where agreement already exists; and in what ways existing NWFZs and no-first-use agreements could apply to the Middle East.
On the technical aspects, the report offers ideas and highlights issues on how to implement WMD weapons and programs disarmament and create an “effectively verifiable” verification mechanism.
The report identifies sets of lessons learned from the five NWFZs, previous WMD dismantlement
- iii Planning Ahead: A Blueprint to Negotiate and Implement a WMDFZ in the Middle East March 2015 experiences such as South Africa, Libya, and Syria, and existing regional verification organizations such as ABACC and Euratom. Importantly, it is essential for the political and technical experts to work hand-in-hand to ensure that the politically desirable falls within the realm of the technically feasible.
This includes examining what are the verification lessons from past cases of WMD disarmament and dismantlement, to what extent will states be required to declare past or existing WMD programs, how can negotiators address the strategic linkages in the region between acquisition and dismantlement of chemical and nuclear weapons; and how and by whom will verification of dismantlement and compliance be conducted.
On the organizational level, the experts’ group could define how broadly or narrowly issues concerning the Zone will be defined. While the Zone may be defined narrowly to address the proliferation of WMD in the region, it is important to note that not one of the existing NWFZs exists in the absence of a regional architecture and agreed upon principles for cooperation and security.
The experts’ group may want to address the underlying causes for regional WMD acquisition, as well as to adopt a set of principles regarding arms control and regional security that would govern relations among states in the region. To assist overcoming the prevailing mistrust, the group should also discuss the role of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as part of the Zone negotiation and implementation, and identify relevant unconventional and conventional CBMs to be implemented as part of the Zone.
The group could also recommend whether there is a need to establish a regional organization to ensure implementation of the treaty, address compliance and enforcement issues, and promote the peaceful applications of nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies. Given the prevailing reality of the region where non-state actors have tried to acquire WMD capabilities, targeted strategic infrastructure, and have gained control over significant territories (including where WMDs are located), the group could address how the Zone provisions would tackle this emerging threat.
If regional states are unwilling to commit experts to the process, an alternative route is to establish the dialogue as a track-two or track-one-and-a-half process. Because of the unique political and geostrategic circumstances of the region, nongovernmental experts have played a critical role by providing the only forum for regional dialogue on arms control and nonproliferation in the Middle East since 1995, thus having much to offer in laying the foundations for an eventual WMDFZ.
IntroductIon Freei ng the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and establishing a weaponof-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) are ideas that originated many decades ago. Nevertheless, significant gaps regarding core concepts of the zone negotiations and implementation exist both within the Middle East and internationally. The objective of this report is to address this gap with regard to the planned WMDFZ Middle East Conference, negotiation process, and the subsequent establishment of such a zone by identifying the legal, technical, and institutional elements required to support the zone negotiations and implementation.
Creating a WMDFZ is a very tall order; not only has the world never negotiated one before, but all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) sought only to formalize an already existing situation— the absence of nuclear weapons in the region. The WMDFZ, by contrast, is aimed at reversing the status quo by dismantling existing WMD capabilities and programs. Additionally, while there are regional and international regimes and organizations charged with verifying NWFZs and the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programs and chemical industries (both of which could inform the WMDFZ negotiators), there is no comparable setup or processes to cover WMD dismantlement, sensitive activities for biological programs, nor WMD delivery systems—all of which are mandated under the conceptual Middle East WMDFZ.
The report identifies an array of issues that the zone negotiators would have to address prior to and during the negotiations, and offers a range of options as possible solutions. These options described throughout the paper as possible solutions are based on lessons learned from past regional and international mechanisms and offer potential starting points for discussion. These options should be considered by regional states in conjunction with the specific circumstances of the Middle East and the WMDFZ objectives, keeping in mind—and avoiding prejudging—these measures’ functions and objectives within the other regimes.
The paper is aimed at providing a blueprint to the negotiators at the stage that parties are willing and interested in seriously negotiating the WMDFZ (the “Zone”). So far, even launching the process has proven a daunting challenge. This report decidedly does not cover the strategic and political aspects related to launching Middle East WMDFZ negotiations, such as the conditions, prospects, or feasibility of its establishment, as those have been covered at length by many other experts and government officials. The topics and options identified in this report offer the WMDFZ negotiators and implementers a template or a blueprint to constructively prepare for the negotiations process at national, regional, and international levels. The topics covered here do not appear in order of importance, as different weight is given to different issues by different states. Nor are issues covered in order of core versus procedural issues, since some will have to be addressed in parallel, or even during the “pre-negotiations” stage.